The Antitrusting of Patentability by Vishnubhakat, Saurabh
VISHNUBHAKAT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2017 5:28 PM 
 
71 
The Antitrusting of Patentability 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat* 
Deciding a patent’s validity is costly, and so is deciding it incorrectly.  
Judges and juries must expend significant resources in order to reach a 
patent validity determination that is properly informed by the relevant facts.  
At the same time, patent validity determinations reached quickly and cheaply 
may conserve resources today while creating future costs.  Wrongly 
preserving an invalid patent can distort the competitive market and enable 
abuses, such as nuisance litigation.  Meanwhile, wrongly striking down a 
valid patent can undermine incentives for continued investment and 
commercialization in knowledge assets.  Courts facing patent validity issues 
have begun to strike this balance in favor of conserving resources today—in 
a manner that is strikingly similar to the per se analysis in antitrust law.  A 
per se rule disposes of supposedly easy cases without engaging in the more 
fact-intensive “rule of reason” analysis.  However, although antitrust 
jurisprudence cautions against per se rules because of the risk of error and 
imposes important requirements for the use of per se rules, recent patent 
jurisprudence has borrowed incautiously from antitrust. 
This Article explains how the requirements for patentability enable the 
use of per se analysis, describes how the proper conditions for antitrust per 
se analysis would translate into patent law, and argues that the current use 
of antitrust-style judicial shortcuts does not satisfy these conditions in patent 
law.  This Article concludes with a set of proposals for recalibrating the 
present costs of reaching informed patent validity decisions against the 
future costs that arise from generating decisions incorrectly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just as the antitrust system seeks to penalize anticompetitive conduct 
while leaving procompetitive conduct alone, the patent system seeks to deny 
patents to inventions that are not truly patentable—because they do not 
satisfy the various requirements of patentability—while leaving intact 
patents that cover meritorious inventions.  Both systems grapple with the 
jurisprudential tension between legal standards and legal rules that is 
inherent in managing error costs.  Only antitrust law, however, has evolved 
a systematic approach to managing decision costs.  That approach is to 
evaluate conduct under the costly but more accurate rule of reason unless the 
risk of error is suitably low that a per se rule having relatively low decision 
costs may profitably be adopted instead.  Moreover, as there is an inverse 
relationship between decision costs and error costs, the antitrust approach 
also includes a limited evidentiary compromise embodied in so-called quick 
look review. 
Patent law has begun to borrow from this approach by using the 
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter as a shorthand for the more fact-
intensive and costly doctrinal inquiries into whether an invention is truly 
patentable.  In other words, subject-matter eligibility has become a sort of 
per se rule of validity (or rather invalidity) whereas other, more finely-
grained requirements of patentability reflect the usual rule of reason.  This 
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“antitrusting” of patentability—the use of jurisprudential tools of decision 
from antitrust in evaluating patent validity—is relatively new in patent law. 
This Article identifies that trend and critiques its current form.  The 
management of legal decision costs through conclusive presumptions amid 
an otherwise fact-intensive analysis is not unique to antitrust.  Still, antitrust 
law has a particularly well-developed history and jurisprudence in this 
regard, and it is fitting in some respects that evaluators of patent validity have 
come to rely on antitrust law to solve this problem given the close 
relationship between the subjects of patent and antitrust. 
Whether patents are tantamount to monopolies, and should be treated 
accordingly, is a longstanding debate in the law.  Early courts referred at 
times to patent rights as a form of monopoly.1  Some, however, took pains 
to distinguish patents from monopolies.2  Modern patent jurisprudence is of 
two minds on the subject.  The Supreme Court generally continues to refer 
to patents as a form of monopoly.3  By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit often rejects sweeping comparisons of patents to 
monopolies.4  This is significant because the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over patent-related cases5 and, as a result, sets the large 
majority of precedent in patent law.  Indeed, beyond the commonsense 
 
 1  E.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494 (1850) (“[T]he monopoly granted to the 
patentee is for one entire thing; it is the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others 
to be used, the improvement he has invented, and for which the patent is granted.”); Evans v. 
Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 413 (1822) (“[P]atent law confers a benefit on the discoverer of any artful 
invention, which consists in a monopoly of his invention for a limited time.”).   
 2  E.g., Singer v. Walmsley, 22 F. Cas. 207, 208 (C.C.D. Md. 1860) (“Patents are not 
monopolies . . . because a monopoly is that which segregates that which was common before, 
and gives it to one person or to a class, for use or profit; a patent is that which brings out from 
the realm of mind something that never existed before, and gives it to the country.”).   
 3  See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) 
(“Congress has enacted patent laws rewarding inventors with a limited monopoly.”); Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010) (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would 
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an 
abstract idea.”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing a patent as an 
“exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (referring to the “patent monopoly”).   
 4  See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 756 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“[T]his court has disapproved of a challenger’s characterization of a patentee by the 
term ‘monopolist’ . . . .”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that “patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust 
sense of that word”); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that, although a patent may colloquially be referred to as a “monopoly”—in light 
of the implicit power to exclude competitors from the marketplace—this usage is misdirected 
because “a patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a patent 
is but the essence of the concept of property”); Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 
786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that “[n]owhere in any statute is a patent described as a 
monopoly” and calling it “but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as ‘the patent monopoly’”).   
 5  28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).   
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expectation that a single intermediate appellate court with exclusive 
jurisdiction would naturally set the large majority of precedent in a given 
field as compared with the vanishingly small share of decisional law that 
comes from the Supreme Court, empirical research specifically finds that 
district courts also view the Federal Circuit as relatively more authoritative 
than they view the Supreme Court in matters of patent law.6 
The importance of this ongoing debate over patents as monopolies is 
systemic.  If patent rights and their exclusionary powers were best 
understood as exceptions to the legal and economic preference against 
monopolies, then it stands to reason that three results would follow.  First, 
laws by which inventions are deemed patentable would tend to be construed 
stringently.  Second, laws by which exercises of patent rights are deemed 
violative of antitrust laws would tend to be construed expansively.  Third, 
the validity of individual patents would tend to be evaluated with an eye to 
their anticompetitive effects over and above their compliance solely with 
patentability rules. 
This Article specifically examines the third of these implications of an 
antitrust-based view of patent law.  The descriptive contribution of this 
Article is to rethink the relationship between patent law’s broad threshold 
requirement of subject-matter eligibility and other, narrower statutory 
requirements in evaluating patentability as being akin to antitrust law’s 
relationship between the per se rule and the rule of reason in evaluating 
restraints of trade.  Tracing the implications of this rethinking through the 
processes for ex ante examination in the Patent Office and ex post 
reevaluation of patent validity, this Article reaches three normative 
conclusions for adjudicating the boundaries of patent-eligible subject matter. 
First, courts that do apply the subject-matter eligibility doctrine can 
properly do so only after specifying the technological field of the patented 
invention and identifying the person of ordinary skill in that relevant field, 
just as the Patent Office does.  Second, courts that purport to find patents 
invalid for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter can properly do so only 
after construing what invention the patent actually claims.  Third, and 
following from the first two, the recently proposed Crouch-Merges canon of 
avoiding patent eligibility questions unless necessary is sound and should be 
adopted by the courts.7 
 
 
 6  See, e.g., David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent 
Precedent: An Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and Intellectual Property Ideology, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 1177 (2012).   
 7  See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski By Ordering 
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010). See also infra Part 
IV.C. 
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This Article proceeds in three main parts.  Part II situates the trade-off 
between error costs in individual cases and doctrinal predictability over time 
within the familiar framework of legal standards and rules.  It also identifies 
the complementary framework through which antitrust law manages the 
trade-off between error costs and decision costs.  It then explains how these 
frameworks apply to the relationship between the broad doctrine of patent-
eligible subject matter and the other, more narrow requirements for 
patentability.  Part III argues that ex post reevaluations of patent validity 
increasingly follow the antitrust approach to minimize decision costs but do 
so incompletely, without the necessary doctrinal underpinnings that even 
antitrust analysis requires.  Part IV advocates for filling these doctrinal gaps 
in patent-eligible subject matter analysis by additional necessary fact-finding 
and offers independent support for the recently proposed Crouch-Merges 
canon. 
II. WHY PATENT LAW NEEDED ANTITRUST LAW 
This part discusses how patent jurisprudence has attempted to balance 
the cost of errors in individual cases against the value of predictability in the 
long run.  It then discusses a complementary approach from antitrust law for 
balancing the cost of decision-making against the cost of error in those 
decisions.  This part concludes that the antitrust approach to reducing 
decision costs may be particularly well suited for efficiently resolving 
disputes over patent validity if certain conditions are met. 
A. Error Costs in Patent Law 
The trade-off in patent law between reducing error costs and fostering 
predictability tracks the broader, more fundamental debate in law between 
standards and rules.8  The primary instrumental aim of patent law and policy 
is to promote innovative activity—including invention, disclosure, and 
 
 8  See generally John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (2009).  For a discussion of the relative benefits and costs of 
rules and standards in general (rather than in the context of patent law), see FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, 
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 
(2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 
(1997); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 
(1995). 
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commercialization—and to direct that activity to socially useful ends.9  
Flexible standards, in turn, allow the patent system to manage the constant 
technological and economic change that innovation necessarily represents.10  
Moreover, to the extent that strategic behavior that outpaces existing legal 
constraints is undesirable, standards also give decision makers valuable 
discretion to penalize conduct that otherwise might evade liability.11  Thus, 
a standard-based approach to patentability reduces error costs in two ways.  
One way is to reduce the likelihood that a court will reach an incorrect 
conclusion about whether a particular invention is patentable under current 
law—incorrect in the sense that the result is unsatisfying according to some 
extrinsic legal criterion.12  The other is to avoid dynamic losses from conduct 
that would, if permitted, stifle future innovative activity.13  The flexibility 
and discretion that standards offer, however, come at a cost.  Standards offer 
little predictability in how the law will eventually be applied and how one’s 
present conduct will be adjudged in the future.14 
Rules, by contrast, are more definite than standards with respect to the 
constraints that are imposed and the compliance that is required.15  The 
principal value of a rule-based approach is that it produces case outcomes 
 
 9  See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999) (describing “success in stimulating 
the creation, disclosure, and development of inventive or creative works” as the “central 
instrumental goals of intellectual property”).  For discussions of this instrumental view of the 
patent system in the economic literature, see, for example, FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980); see also Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 (Univs.-Nat’l 
Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research et al. eds., 1962), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf 
(describing the problem of nonoptimal allocation of resources in generating information assets 
that will be optimally utilized, and explaining how patent property rights in such information 
resolve this problem by restricting the degree to which a firm can appropriate the full value 
of the information that it generates).   
 10  Duffy, supra note 8, at 611.   
 11  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1639 (2003) (observing that standards, unlike rules, are flexible enough to “take 
situational variance into account,” i.e., produce more accurate outcomes).   
 12  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 798–99 (2008) (explaining the greater tendency 
of standards than of rules to result in more accurate outcomes).   
 13  See id. at 798–800 (discussing the inhibitive effect of inaccurate results in the 
patentability determination upon future progress and innovation).   
 14  See id. at 798 (comparing the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s respective patent 
jurisprudences as differently answering the same question of how to balance precision with 
accuracy in the law of patentability).   
 15  See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1771–72 
(2011) (observing that rules, unlike standards, offer “ease of conforming one’s conduct to that 
[given legal] principle” in patent law based on a variety of factors including “the uncertainty 
associated with individualized determinations of patentability”).   
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that more closely align with prior judicial precedents and, by the same token, 
more closely align with the prior expectations of the parties.16  Meanwhile, 
a more precise and predictable rule may also be consistently wrong 
according to some extrinsic legal criterion, especially given the inflexibility 
of rules for adapting to circumstances that were unforeseen and 
uncontemplated by prior decisions.17  In short, the greater predictability of 
rules comes at the cost of potentially higher error costs. 
This trade-off has differential effects for private actors in the markets 
for innovation as well as for legal institutions.  Producers and consumers of 
innovation each respond differently to uncertain but more adaptable 
standards, and to inflexible but potentially inaccurate rules.  Legal 
institutions respond differently to standards versus rules as well. 
Producer-side actors in innovation markets—e.g., inventors, investors, 
and commercializers—tend to favor rules because more certainty produces 
higher risk-adjusted returns on the fixed costs of innovation, costs that can 
be substantial.18  A particularly salient example of an innovation market with 
high fixed costs is biomedicine where the impact of uncertainty from 
standards is well-documented in the academic literature as well as in public 
policy circles.19  Where this type of legal certainty (that innovation incentives 
such as patents will be protected and recouped as expected) is reduced or 
altogether absent, the resulting declines in rates of research and development 
also tend to be concentrated in the most socially important technologies, i.e., 
technologies in which the generation and disclosure of knowledge would be 
most valuable.20  One may reasonably expect, for example, that clear rules 
about the patentability of medical diagnostic tests will tend to reduce 
uncertainty about ex post competition and thus increase ex ante investment 
in the development of such tests.21 
 
 
 16  Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 
79–81 (2010).   
 17  Id. at 81; Sullivan, supra note 8, at 63.   
 18  Duffy, supra note 8, at 611; Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point 
of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1314 n.96 (2006) (“[I]t seems likely that ‘producers’ 
in . . . a competitive system would work hard to provide definite rules and eschew vague 
standards, whenever that is possible.”).  
 19  E.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of 
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1911 (2016) (arguing that “uncertainty 
itself affects incentives to innovate, as scientists and investors may be reluctant to move 
forward with product development if they cannot determine whether they will be able to 
protect their investment”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES 
FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 14 (2008), http://oncotherapy.us/pdf/PM.Priorities.pdf.  
 20  Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standards for Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1, 2–3 (1992).  
 21  E.g., Asher Hodes, Note, Diagnosing Patentable Subject Matter, 26 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 225, 261–62 (2011).  
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This expected relationship among clarity of rules, competition, and 
investment is a straightforward application of the prospect theory of patent 
incentives.22  Even if early innovators who secure broad rights are 
overcompensated “well beyond what the reward function would require”23 
to induce the given innovation, the patentee is better positioned to 
“coordinate post-patenting development and commercialization efforts 
among several players, reducing duplicated costs and preventing 
competitors’ use of unpatentable information generated in the process.”24 
Accordingly, as clear rules about the very patent-eligibility of medical 
diagnostic tests are discarded in favor of flexible and unpredictable 
standards, as the Supreme Court did in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,25 the result is uncertainty among industry 
actors about whether the patented innovations that undergird their activities 
remain stable legal rights that can justify further investment.  As one 
commentator has put it, “subject matter patentability has never been more 
uncertain than after Mayo.  Many patents in the biotechnology, medical 
diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at their 
core.  But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have added 
‘enough’ to the claims to render them patent eligible.”26 
By contrast, consumer actors in innovation markets—e.g., users and 
implementers of technology, and, in some cases, the general public—tend to 
favor standards because rules may generate allocative losses for consumers 
of innovation.  The inflexibility of rules to adapt to changing economic or 
technological conditions may create certainty, but substantive outcomes are 
more likely at the margin to be incorrect, all else being equal.  The example 
of medical diagnostic innovation remains helpful in this regard as well.  
Although the criteria governing patent-eligibility were considerably more 
rule-like prior to the Supreme Court’s recent doctrinal interventions,27 it was 
far from clear that the particular legal rules in place produced outcomes that 
 
 22  John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 
(2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 374–76 
(2010).  
 23  Kitch, supra note 22, at 267.  
 24  Sichelman, supra note 22, at 374–75.  
 25  566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 26  Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2014).  
See also Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 432 (2012) (explaining 
that “Mayo has created a kind of pessimistic uncertainty”).   
 27  See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1363 (2010) (arguing that subject-matter eligibility exclusions in patent 
law “are almost always bright-line rules”); Duffy, supra note 7, at 611 (characterizing the 
Federal Circuit’s en banc attempt in the Bilski case to clarify the law of patent-eligibility as a 
“rule—not a flexible standard”).   
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were consistently accurate. 
The Mayo case was itself an instance where the Patent Office’s 
application of the subject-matter eligibility doctrine—with its bright-line 
rule exclusions from eligibility—led the agency to issue patents that, the 
Court ultimately found, should not have been issued.  These patents were 
directed to correlations between the concentration in the bloodstream of 
certain drug metabolites and the efficacy or toxicity of the drug.28  The 
petitioners in the case argued, and the Court’s unanimous opinion concluded, 
that the rule was problematic not only for being inflexible, but also for being 
the wrong rule, or at least a rule that produced the wrong outcome in the case 
at hand.29  By over-inclusively allowing patent claims that preempted the use 
of natural correlations, which are ineligible for patent protection, the rule-
like approach to patent-eligibility produced patents that the Mayo Court 
found frustrated the ability of physicians to provide medical care30 and the 
ability of others in medical diagnostics to innovate further.31 
To be sure, the dichotomy of preference between innovators and 
implementers as to rules and standards is not absolute.  Innovators might 
well be “sacrificed on the altar of rules” where, for example, the inflexible 
application of patentability requirements leads to the invalidation of patent 
rights, and such innovators would prefer standards over rules.32  Still, the 
incentives that the certainty and consistency of rules produce for investments 
in the long term are generally quite different from the incentives that the 
flexibility and accuracy of standards offer in the individualized short run. 
Different legal institutions also confront different effects from 
informational asymmetry that shapes their respective tendencies toward 
standards versus rules.  On one hand, developing rules carries high 
information costs,33 and the Federal Circuit can afford these costs because of 
its relatively greater access to doctrinal and technical expertise.34  
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has less access to these forms of expertise 
and so tends to favor standards because of their lower information costs.35 
 
 28  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (citing 
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 and U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302).   
 29  Id. at 91–92.   
 30  Id. at 91.   
 31  Id. at 92.   
 32  Schauer, supra note 7, at 135–66; see also Sullivan, supra note 7, at 66. 
 33  Kaplow, supra note 7, at 627–29 (formalizing the relationship between the tendency 
to prefer rules versus standards and the information cost that is associated with promulgating 
the rule or promulgating the standard).  
 34  Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29–40 (2010) 
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s use of rule-formalism in four important doctrinal contexts as 
a deliberate attempt to “reduce information costs associated with lay engagement with 
technology”).   
 35  Id. at 42.  
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The principal jurisprudential debate of the patent system, then, is over 
how to balance decreasing error costs through standards and increasing 
predictability through rules.  Indeed, a number of other important ongoing 
debates in patent law reflect this tension, and the functionalism of the 
Supreme Court, as well as the formalism of the Federal Circuit, track the 
former’s preference for standards and the latter’s preference for rules.36  The 
controversy over exceptionalism in patent doctrine is itself at least partly 
reducible to a choice between standards that transcend legal subject matter 
and rules that are tailored to patent law.37 
Indeed, the forms of patent exceptionalism that are sensitive to the 
rules-standards dichotomy variously include federal jurisdiction in patent 
law,38 jury review of Patent Office agency actions,39 judicial deference to 
Patent Office agency actions both legal40 as well as factual,41 and federal civil 
procedure in patent cases.42 
Importantly, this balance in patent law between reducing error costs and 
fostering predictability omits an additional important consideration: the costs 
of generating decisions under either approach.  Indeed, patent law does not 
appear to have an internal jurisprudential consensus about how to balance 
decision costs with other values.  For that, it has come to rely on antitrust. 
B. Decision Costs in Antitrust 
The error cost inquiry in patent law decision-making focuses on what 
consequences will follow from false-positive decisions (such as upholding 
an invalid patent) or false-negative ones (such as striking down a valid 
patent).  By contrast, the decision cost inquiry focuses on how decision-
makers reach decisions at all.  Decision costs account for the collection and 
synthesis of relevant factual and doctrinal information by litigants as well as 
 
 36  See generally David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law 
Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415 (2013). 
 37  Id. at 490.  
 38  Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791 (2013). 
 39  John F. Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
281 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 
1673 (2013). 
 40  Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental 
Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2013); Kali Murray, First Things, First: A Principled 
Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (2008); Melissa F. 
Wasserman The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013). 
 41  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899 (2017); 
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 39. 
 42  Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63 (2015).  
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for the evaluation of this information by the triers of fact and law.43  Given 
that patent law has no systematic approach for managing decision costs, 
antitrust law’s longstanding approach has proven to be a ready substitute.  
That approach is antitrust law’s distinction between conduct that is per se 
unlawful and conduct that is unlawful under the rule of reason.44 
The use of a per se rule lowers decision costs, often dramatically, 
because simply far less remains to fight about.  In antitrust, certain categories 
of conduct are regarded as unlawful per se only if they pose restraints of 
trade “that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output.”45  Otherwise, and in general, restraints are unlawful only 
if they are shown to be unreasonable—which is to say, shown to have an 
overall anticompetitive rather than procompetitive effect in the particular 
case at hand.46  This more intensive analysis, the rule of reason, requires 
information about whether the accused party had sufficient market power, 
and a host of other factors regarding “the restraint’s history, nature, and 
effect.”47  As a result, the rule of reason carries high decision costs, and what 
these costs buy is more accurate decision-making by reducing the likelihood 
of accepting anticompetitive practices and of condemning procompetitive 
ones.  Decision costs in general are inversely related to error costs.48 
Horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices are a canonical 
example of the trade-off in antitrust between the decision costs and error 
costs of the per se rule and the rule of reason.49  All that must be established 
is that certain practices do, indeed, constitute horizontal price fixing—and 
the outcome is determined.50  Particular agreements to fix prices may, 
indeed, sometimes have procompetitive effects that outweigh their 
anticompetitive potential.51  Nevertheless, courts have held that such net-
positive outcomes are so rare and unlikely that the costs of mistakenly 
condemning a price-fixing agreement that might have turned out to be 
beneficial is quite low, and price-fixing agreements as a category should be 
conclusively presumed unreasonable and unlawful, without further 
 
 43  Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
871, 877 (2011).  
 44  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1984). 
 45  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citing 
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).  
 46  Id. at 885–86 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 47  Id. at 885. 
 48  Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 15.  See generally Ehrlich, supra note 7. 
 49  Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 50  Id. at 344–45 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)). 
 51  Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (acknowledging that 
“[c]ases that do not fit the generalization [underlying a per se rule] may arise”).  
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analysis.52  In other words, courts have found the per se rule to be a useful 
analytical tool for adjudicating price-fixing agreements, not merely because 
it has low decision costs but because those low decision costs do not come 
at the expense of unduly high error costs. 
Of course, purporting to impose and use per se rules only where their 
associated error costs are also low is an idealized case, even in antitrust law.  
The underlying technical and economic facts that make a particular practice 
not merely potentially unreasonable, but per se unreasonable, may change.53  
Similarly, empirical research may reveal that the reasoning that connects 
underlying facts to legal conclusions is flawed.54  Put another way, a per se 
rule by its own terms can assure only that its decision costs will be low; its 
error costs may rise over time or later be revealed to have been higher all 
along.  The rule of reason, meanwhile, presents a symmetric situation: 
though its decision costs are high, the investment of careful scrutiny into 
case-specific context means that the associated error costs are likely to be 
low. 
Given this general tension between decision cost and error cost, it is 
perhaps not surprising that litigants frequently focus, as an initial matter, on 
characterizing the disputed conduct strategically as belonging either in the 
category of practices that are per se unlawful or in the category that merits 
rule of reason analysis.55  Determining the legal status of the disputed 
conduct has its own costs, and courts must be able to do so without unduly 
dissipating the decisional economy of the per se rule.  Accordingly, a third 
way has emerged whereby a party accused of certain practices that the per 
se rule would cover may offer limited evidence of the procompetitive 
benefits of the practice.56  If this quick look at the evidence is persuasive, 
then the court will proceed to evaluate the practice more fully under the rule 
of reason; if not, the per se rule will determine the outcome.57  Thus, the 
quick look accepts some additional decision cost in exchange for lowering 
the error cost—or, more precisely, in exchange for more information about 
the likelihood of error. 
 
 52  Maricopa Cty., 457 U.S. at 351 (holding that “the anticompetitive potential inherent 
in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive 
justifications are offered for some”).  
 53  Easterbrook, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that “practices that were deleterious yesterday 
may yield benefits today, as the balance of advantage between contractual and market 
organization changes”). 
 54  Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1266 (2008). 
 55  See id. at 1215.  
 56  See generally Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 57  Id. at 769–70.  
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C. Borrowing from Antitrust 
This orientation of antitrust jurisprudence toward the balance between 
decision cost and error cost is strikingly and directly relevant to patent law.  
However, this relevance is not widely discussed or applied in patent policy 
debates. 
1. The Decision Cost of Invalidating Patents 
Determining that an invalid patent is invalid is costly.  Part of the reason 
is that duly issued patents are legally presumed valid,58 and a party 
challenging its validity bears the burden of overcoming that presumption59 
by clear and convincing evidence.60  There are at least two rationales for 
presuming patents valid. 
One is the premise that the decision to issue patents follows from the 
evaluative efforts of an expert agency whose conclusions are likely to be 
correct, at least more likely than inexpert courts acting later.61  Patents are 
issued after substantive evaluation in the Patent Office by examiners who 
have education and training in the relevant scientific and technical 
disciplines to which the patented inventions pertain.62  A patent examiner’s 
evaluation compares the invention sought to be patented with the relevant 
prior art, which is the existing body of knowledge and commercial activity.63  
The examination process is intended to grant patents only on those 
inventions that are innovative enough to merit patent protection64 and are 
sufficiently well-disclosed that others may benefit meaningfully from what 
the patent document teaches.65  Thus, examination proceeds on the basis of 
expertise with the technical details of the invention and with the doctrinal 
 
 58  35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).  
 59  Id.  
 60  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 
 61  Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 
331 n.35–36 (2008) (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 52 (2007) (noting that 
“the presumption of validity forces courts to defer to the expertise of the PTO, thereby 
avoiding redundant and possibly inferior second looks by the courts”).  
 62  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 47 (noting further that “[t]he theoretical 
justification [for the presumption of validity] is that patent examiners have expertise when it 
comes to questions of patent validity, and if patent examiners have decided that a given 
invention qualifies for protection, judges and juries should not second-guess the experts.”).  
 63  Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L. & ECON. 399, 
399–400 (2010).  The various forms of documentary knowledge and commercial activity that 
constitute prior art are set forth in the various provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 64  For a discussion of the innovation-related requirements of patentability, see infra Part 
III.A.1. 
 65  For a discussion of the disclosure-related requirements of patentability, see infra Part 
III.A.2. 
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details of patentability, expertise that courts are generally understood to lack 
when they revisit the Patent Office’s conclusions.66 
Another rationale for presuming patents valid is that patent rights form 
the basis for significant economic investments in technology development 
and commercialization by ensuring that the exclusionary power of patents 
will later help recoup those investments.67  Without an expectation that 
issued patents are likely to be legally valid, the stability and security of these 
investments will tend to erode,68 and rational investors will consider 
reducing and redirecting their investments to other legal regimes for 
appropriating value from innovation.69  However, these substitute legal 
regimes may not be desirable from the perspective of social welfare and the 
dissemination of knowledge. 
One particularly stark example of this effect is trade secrecy.  On one 
hand, the mandatory disclosure requirements of patent law may well “lead 
to the underproduction of certain inventions, namely those inventions in 
which patent infringement detection would be difficult and therefore trade 
secrecy more valuable.”70  On the other hand, however, the lack of mandated 
disclosure in trade secrecy would leave inventors who are patent-averse for 
any reason “free to maintain inventions as trade secrets, and rational actors 
will do precisely that.”71  Thus, when abridging or invalidating an individual 
patent, the danger of doing so in ways that systemically weaken patent rights 
has long been a cautionary argument for courts, especially the Federal 
Circuit72 and the Supreme Court.73 
Beyond the presumption of validity and its effects, the decision cost of 
invalidating a patent also includes the expense of mounting the invalidity 
challenge.  This expense is considerable for two reasons of its own. 
 
 
 66  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52 (referring to judicial reevaluations as 
“inferior second looks”); Devlin, supra note 61, at 325 (rhetorically questioning, “[w]ho are 
lay judges and juries, typically lacking technical and scientific knowledge in the relevant field, 
to second guess the PTO’s expertise and informed judgment?”).  
 67  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52, 56–59; Devlin, supra note 61, at 331. 
 68  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52, 56–59; Devlin, supra note 61, at 331. 
 69  See generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent 
(or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), 
www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (discussing a range of mechanisms for appropriating value from 
innovation, the relative usage of each by actors in different industries, and the motivations for 
these choices). 
 70  J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 963 (2011). 
 71  Id. at 963–64. 
 72  E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 
F.3d 1046, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting).   
 73  E.g., Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646 (1947).   
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One is simply that patent litigation demands significant material 
resources, and its demands have mostly increased over time.  The biennial 
surveys of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, for example, 
show that among low-end patent infringement cases with less than $1 million 
in dispute, the median cost of litigation ranged from $600,000 to as high as 
$700,000 during the 2005–2015 period.74  For high-end cases with more than 
$25 million in dispute, the median cost of litigation ranged from $4.5 million 
to as high as $5.5 million over the same period.75  Meanwhile, a party who 
prevails in litigation cannot recover these costs through court-ordered fee-
shifting, save for exceptional cases, making even successful patent 
invalidation a cost that the challenger must often simply absorb.76 
The other reason why the expense of patent invalidation is high is that 
a successful challenger does not merely win the right to practice the patented 
invention alone.77  A patent that is invalidated is invalid as against the world, 
and the successful challenger opens the door for other rivals to practice the 
invention as well, including a great many who contributed nothing to the 
expense and effort of mounting the challenge.78  In other words, patent 
validity decisions are a type of public economic good and accordingly can 
often pose a significant collective action problem.79 
2. The Importance of Invalidating (Bad) Patents 
Still, despite the high cost, correctly determining that a patent is invalid 
can be quite socially valuable.  Patents confer powerful rights to exclude 
others from making, using, selling, offering, and importing the invention 
protected by the patent.80  A subset of these patents reflect meaningful 
economic power in their relevant markets in light of available substitutes,81 
 
 74  AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2015).   
 75  Id.   
 76  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 77  See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) 
(holding that a finding of patent invalidity creates nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel 
with respect to the patent owner’s assertion of the patent against all future alleged infringers).   
 78  See generally Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004). 
 79  John A. Kidwell, Comity, Patent Validity, and the Search for Symmetry: Son of 
Blonder-Tongue, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 473, 488–89 (1975); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a 
Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 
688 (2004). 
 80  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 81  The conventional wisdom, of course, is that most patents confer no such power.  John 
R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 462 n.115 (2004) (citing HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST ch. 4 (2003); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.3 (1985; Salem M. Katsh, Jack E. Brown, & F.M. Scherer, 
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and this power is justified only if the patented invention satisfies the criteria 
of genuine innovation and public disclosure that the law has set as the price 
of the patent’s exclusionary power.82 
By contrast, the issuance of patents for inventions embodying 
knowledge that is already available to the public or is already involved in 
existing commercial activity83 would produce an economic distortion by 
withdrawing that knowledge from competitive use in the short term, with no 
corresponding social benefit in the long term.84 Similar economic distortions 
would arise from patents for inventions embodying knowledge that may 
technically be new but is only trivially removed from the state of the art and 
would have come about even without the inducement of the patent.85  In both 
situations, the patent owner’s right to exclude would tend to raise the price 
of the invention to supracompetitive levels, producing static inefficiencies in 
the form of deadweight losses.  These are static inefficiencies that patent law 
would otherwise tolerate if there were dynamic efficiency gains from the 
production of truly innovative knowledge.  Without adequate innovation, 
however, there would be only the loss. 
 
 
 
 
Panel Discussion, The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, 53 
ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985) (“Statistical studies suggest that the vast majority of all 
patents confer very little monopoly power”); William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption 
of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1156 (1985) (“More often than not, however, a patent or copyright 
provides little, if any, market power.”).  
 82  For a discussion of the innovation-related and disclosure-related requirements of 
patentability, see infra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2. 
 83  Knowledge already available to the public would be prior art in the form of earlier-
issued patents, published patent applications, and “printed publications.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
Knowledge already involved in commercial activity would be prior art in the form of a good 
or service that is “on sale.”  Id.  Knowledge “in public use” would be prior art under either 
rubric.  Id. 
 84  The rhetoric of withdrawing information from the public domain on the basis of 
improperly issued patents is a recurring concern in the case law as well as the literature.  See, 
e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that 
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available”).  
See also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25 (2011); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1002 n.247 (2007). 
 85  Pamela Samuelson, Lecture, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 
783, 808 n.139 (citing Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting 
Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge in The Public Domain of 
Information, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN 
INFORMATION LAW (Lucie M.C.R. Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006)). 
VISHNUBHAKAT_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2017  5:28 PM 
2017] THE ANTITRUSTING OF PATENTABILITY  87 
Further, even patents that satisfy the innovation-related requirements of 
patentability may result in overall inefficiency if they do not adequately 
disclose what the invention is,86 how to practice it,87 and what the boundaries 
of the patent right are.88  Failure to satisfy these disclosure requirements 
would allow patent owners to enjoy exclusionary power in the market that is 
sometimes highly disproportionate to the patents’ inventive contributions.  
The relationship of these disclosure-related requirements to the normatively 
desired economic balance of patent law is usually expressed as 
commensurability between what knowledge the inventor contributes and 
what economic power the patent confers.89  Disclosure failures, therefore, 
are similar to the problem of static inefficiency that results from withdrawing 
already-available or already-forthcoming knowledge from public use—with 
one caveat.  Disclosure failures further create a threat of dynamic 
inefficiency, the withdrawal of knowledge that may be generated tomorrow 
by others under the shadow of overbroad patents issued today. 
The economics of inefficiency in patent law constitute a significant 
theoretical and empirical literature that is beyond the scope of this Article.90  
However, a unifying theme of this literature is that it is socially valuable to 
reach decisions about patent invalidity.  The high decision cost of reaching 
these socially valuable decisions has, in turn, provoked a wide array of 
proposals for procedural and structural reform with mixed success.  The use 
of subject-matter eligibility as a shorthand for other, more fact-intensive 
inquiries into whether an invention is patentable represents a doctrinal 
reform toward the same objective—lowering decision costs. 
 
 
 86  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (codifying the written description requirement). 
 87  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (codifying the enablement requirement). 
 88  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (codifying the claim definiteness requirement). 
 89  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 797 (2002); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim 
Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 506, 509 (2008); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent 
Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1152–53, 1182 (2008). 
 90  For an overview of this literature, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND 
INCENTIVES (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990); William F. Baxter, Legal 
Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 
267 (1966); NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (Univs.-Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research 
et al. eds., 1962), http://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/nbrnberbk/univ62-1.htm; FRITZ 
MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1958), https://perma.cc/8RKE-
WCGM. 
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II. HOW PATENT LAW NOW USES ANTITRUST LAW 
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is capable of reducing 
decision cost because various aspects of the doctrine overlap in significant 
ways with other criteria for patentability.91  Those other criteria are costly to 
apply whereas subject-matter eligibility (in its current form) is less costly to 
apply.  It must ultimately be determined whether this reduction in decision 
cost comes at the expense of unduly increasing the risk of error—simply put, 
whether the decision cost savings are worth it—but the decision cost savings 
are certainly present in most cases.  The other criteria with which subject-
matter eligibility overlaps may be grouped into two sets of requirements: 
those that promote innovation and those that promote disclosure. 
A. Patentability’s Subject Matter Threshold 
1. Policing Innovation 
The innovation-related requirements of patentability include novelty, 
nonobviousness, and utility.  To be novel, an invention in all its particulars 
must not be patented, disclosed, or otherwise available to the public.92  To 
be nonobvious, an invention must be more than a trivial advance—not only 
over individual prior inventions and products, but also over combinations of 
prior inventions and products.93  Finally, to be useful, an invention must 
 
 91  For a comprehensive analytical treatment of doctrinal redundancy in patent law, see 
John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 673–99 (2016).  
More specifically, the relationship between subject-matter eligibility and other doctrinal 
requirements for patentability—especially nonobviousness—has been the subject of much 
debate.  In an important article following the Bilski decision, for example, Professor Josh 
Sarnoff argued “that both patent eligibility under section 101 and patentability under section 
103 require inventive creativity, and that even newly discovered science, nature, and ideas 
must be treated as prior art.”  Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: 
History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 101–02 (2011).  From this, Sarnoff concludes that 
“any claim to categorically excluded subject matter or any claim that lacks invention in 
applying such subject matter should also necessarily be obvious, that is, so long as the 
categorically excluded subject matter is treated as prior art for both eligibility and 
patentability.”  Id. at 102.  Sarnoff’s argument, however, depends on two further premises.  
One is that any inventiveness for eligibility purposes must not require claim construction, i.e., 
must be apparent on the face of the patent.  With this he agrees, though he casts the issue as 
one of satisfying the written description requirement.  See id. at 111.  The other premise, 
however, is absent from his argument—that the court must also determine the relevant field 
of the invention (not merely the person having ordinary skill in that field).  Sarnoff’s overall 
argument is certainly sound in that the desirability of a shortcut varies with the difficulty of 
the task for which the shortcut is used; for example, resource-intensive tasks such as 
construing claims should not be elided.  Nevertheless, the very issue at stake in this Article is 
how resource-intensive certain adjudicatory task should be in order to yield an outcome that 
is both adequately correct and adequately affordable. 
 92  35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 93  35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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fulfill a specific and substantial purpose,94 and although that purpose must 
do more than merely avoid active harm to society,95 a detailed evaluation of 
whether that purpose is economically, morally, or otherwise worth fulfilling 
is largely left to the marketplace.96 
The subject-matter eligibility doctrine reflects each of the innovation-
related requirements in some way.  As an initial matter, processes, machines, 
manufactures, and composition of matters, as well as improvements on these, 
are eligible for patent protection.97  To this broad grant of eligibility, case 
law has added important exceptions.  Patents must not issue on laws (or 
products) of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,98 and the various 
analyses by which courts have previously drawn analogies or distinctions 
between the inventions before them and these categories of patent-ineligible 
subject matter variously implicate novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. 
The product-of-nature exception implicates all three.  At times, courts 
have invoked the exception to invalidate patents on inventions that were 
merely found in nature or were only trivially different from a natural form.  
For example, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that medically valuable genomic DNA 
sequences claimed by Myriad’s patent were products of nature and were 
therefore ineligible for patent protection.99  Although the DNA sequences 
were isolated and purified from their natural state, the Court emphasized that 
the “location and order of the nucleotides [that make up the DNA sequence] 
existed in nature before Myriad found them.”100  The Court’s concern was 
that the invention, in some important sense, lacked newness. 
Conversely, an invention may escape the product-of-nature exception 
if it does exhibit such newness.  For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
the Supreme Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium capable of 
breaking down crude oil was not a product of nature and was therefore 
eligible for patent protection.101  Although the underlying bacterium existed 
naturally in the genus Pseudomonas, the Court emphasized that it had been 
modified with inserted genes that conferred the ability to degrade 
components of crude oil.102  The result was “a new bacterium with markedly 
 
 94  In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 95  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966). 
 96  Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 97  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 98  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). 
 99  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 100  Id. at 2116 (emphasis added). 
 101  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 102  Id. at 305. 
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different characteristics from any found in nature.”103  The Court was 
satisfied that the invention, in the same important sense, had newness. 
At other times, courts have invoked the product-of-nature exception on 
the basis of whether the claimed invention derived its utility from nature’s 
handiwork or from human ingenuity.  For example, in American Fruit 
Growers v. Brogdex Co., the Supreme Court held that fresh citrus fruit with 
rind or skin that had been treated with borax and which was therefore 
resistant to blue mold decay was a product of nature and therefore ineligible 
for patent protection.104  The Court emphasized that although the borax-
treated fruit was not found in nature as such, it underwent “no change in the 
name, appearance, or general character” and remained “fit only for the same 
beneficial uses as theretofore.”105  The Court’s concern was that the 
invention’s utility arose primarily from natural causes rather than from 
human intervention. 
Conversely, an invention may escape the product-of-nature exception 
if its utility does arise from human intervention.  For example, in Parke-
Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., Judge Learned Hand held that adrenalin 
extracted from animal gland tissue and purified was not a product of nature 
and was therefore patent-eligible.106  Although Judge Hand acknowledged 
the chemical occurred in nature, he emphasized that the very act of extracting 
and purifying it, as the inventor had done, rendered it “for every practical 
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”107  Similarly, in 
Chakrabarty, the Court noted that the engineered bacterium by virtue of its 
marked difference also had “the potential for significant utility.”108  In each 
case, the respective court was satisfied that the invention’s utility arose 
primarily from human intervention. 
Beyond products of nature, the law-of-nature and abstract-idea 
exceptions also implicate the patent system’s concern with innovation, 
particularly whether the relevant aspect of an invention is truly inventive—
i.e., nonobvious.  For example, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a method for 
calibrating drug dosage based on how much the drug’s byproducts remained 
in the bloodstream was patent-ineligible because it did no more than apply 
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity” to the laws of nature that 
 
 103  Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
 104  Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
 105  Id. at 11–12. 
 106  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co, 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Parke-Davis & Co v. H K Mulford & Co, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 107  Id. at 103. 
 108  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added). 
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govern how drugs break down in the bloodstream.109  Similarly, in Alice 
Corporation Pty. v. CLS Bank International, the Court extended its 
reasoning in Mayo regarding laws of nature to abstract ideas as well.110  In 
Alice, the Court held that a system for mitigating settlement risk in financial 
transactions did no more than add “‘well-understood, routine, conventional 
activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry” to what the Court believed 
amounted to no more than the abstract idea of electronic recordkeeping and 
was therefore patent-ineligible.111  In both Mayo and Alice, the Court’s 
concern was that, beyond the law of nature or abstract idea on which the 
invention relied, it lacked any truly inventive concept. 
In fact, the degree to which the Court’s concern about the inventive 
concept implicates patent law’s innovation function was quite explicit in the 
Court’s previous approach for evaluating claims related to abstract ideas 
such as mathematic formulas and algorithms—the so-called point of novelty 
test.  Under this approach, the underlying idea, formula, or algorithm was 
treated “as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” and the invention 
was then scrutinized to find “some other inventive concept” in order to be 
considered patent-eligible.112  This fiction—of assuming the underlying 
ineligible natural law or idea into the body of prior knowledge—reveals that 
protecting innovation-related values was a key problem that the Court tried 
to solve through patent eligibility. 
The upshot of these innovation-based views of the product-of-nature, 
law-of-nature, and abstract-idea exceptions is that the doctrine of patent-
eligible subject matter was doing analytical work, and addressing policy 
concerns about the proper scope of the patent system, that the narrower 
doctrines of novelty, nonobviousness, or utility could have done. 
2. Policing Disclosure 
The disclosure-related requirements for patentability include 
enablement and written description.  To be adequately enabled, a patent must 
disclose the invention that it claims with enough operational detail that a 
person having ordinary skill in the relevant technology could practice the 
invention without an undue amount of experimentation.113  To be well-
described, a patent disclosure must convey what invention the inventor 
actually considered herself to possess and supply adequate structural detail 
 
 109  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012). 
 110  Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 111  Id. at 2359 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). 
 112  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–95 
(1978). 
 113  35 U.S.C. § 112(a); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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for patent claims that define the invention in terms of the functions that the 
invention performs.114  The subject-matter eligibility doctrine reflects both 
of these patentability requirements as well. 
As requirements that promote the disclosure of useful technical detail, 
enablement and written description both guard against the same problem: 
patent overbreadth.  There is nothing inherently problematic about broad 
patents or inherently desirable about narrow patents.  The Patent Office may 
properly issue broad or narrow patents just as inventors may generate 
pioneering or incremental inventions to deserve such patents.115  What is 
important to the innovation aims of the patent system is commensurability: 
the breadth of a patent’s claims must not exceed the magnitude of the social 
contribution that the invention represents.116 
Multiple exceptions to patent-eligibility implicate the concern with 
commensurability and the disclosure function of patents.  With respect to 
abstract ideas, for example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated 
patents that it has found overbroad.  For instance, in O’Reilly v. Morse, the 
Court rejected Samuel Morse’s claim to all uses of electromagnetism for 
printing characters at a distance, emphasizing that Morse had invented only 
the particular form of telegraphy that his patent disclosed and that any future 
applications were beyond what his patent described.117 
Similarly, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court rejected a bare method for 
converting binary-coded-decimal numbers into pure binary, emphasizing 
that the method claimed was so “sweeping as to cover both known and 
unknown uses” of the algorithm.118  In both cases, decided more than a 
century apart, the Court’s concern was that the patents in dispute were 
incommensurately broader than what they described and thus broader than 
what the inventor demonstrably possessed as the invention. 
This concern also animated the decision in Parker v. Flook, where the 
Court rejected a method for updating limits on temperature, pressure, and 
other operating conditions that an industrial process should not exceed.119  
The Court held that the patent would “wholly preempt the mathematical 
formula” that was used for calculating the limits from being available in 
 
 114  35 U.S.C. § 112(a); Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 115  For a thorough theoretical account of why pioneering inventions ought to receive 
broad patent rights, see Duffy, supra note 22. 
 116  See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  See also Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s 
Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369 (2013); Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling 
After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009). 
 117  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853). 
 118  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 119  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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other inventive contexts.120  As before, the concern was that the reach of the 
patent would exceed its inventive contribution. 
Meanwhile, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court expressed the same 
concern but was satisfied that the mathematical equation that the inventors 
implemented in a rubber curing process did not “preempt the use of that 
equation” and held the invention patent-eligible.121 
The law-of-nature exception implicates disclosure-related concerns as 
well, in much the same way as the abstract-idea exception does.  In Mayo, 
for example, the Court’s innovation-related concerns about a missing 
“inventive concept” over and above the natural law that governed how a drug 
broke down in the bloodstream were closely aligned with the Court’s further 
concern that upholding the patent would “too broadly preempt the use of 
[that] natural law.”122  The patent in dispute addressed only a specific use of 
the natural correlation between appropriate dosage and the level of drug 
byproducts in the blood, and the Court’s reasoning reflects a concern that 
upholding the patent would foreclose all uses of that natural correlation and 
consequently frustrate commensurability in patent scope. 
As was the case with the innovation-related requirements, the upshot of 
these disclosure-related views of the abstract-idea and law-of-nature 
exceptions is that the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter ultimately 
performed analytical work that the narrower disclosure-related doctrines of 
enablement and written description could have done. 
B. Subject-Matter Eligibility As a Shortcut 
On first impression, it would seem to be a benefit that the doctrine of 
subject-matter eligibility can stand in for the more decision cost-intensive 
patentability requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, 
and written description.  Indeed, litigation data regarding motion practice in 
patent cases indicates that challenges based on subject-matter eligibility do 
stand in for challenges based on these other requirements early in litigation, 
when significant decision costs have not yet accrued.123 
Among motions to dismiss, 83% of challenges to patent validity are 
based on subject-matter ineligibility; among motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, 93% of challenges.  It is only after discovery, among motions for 
summary judgment, that subject-matter ineligibility supports only 7% of 
 
 120  Id. at 589–90. 
 121  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (explaining that the patentee was 
instead, permissibly, seeking “only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process”).   
 122  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
 123  Litigation data is from the Docket Navigator service, which can be accessed at 
http://www.docketnavigator.com. 
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validity challenges while the other, more fact-intensive requirements begin 
to play a more substantial role.  Figures 1-3 illustrate this trend.  Meanwhile, 
it is almost entirely at summary judgment that any grounds other than 
subject-matter ineligibility are raised.  Figures 4-9 illustrate this trend.  In 
other words, the relationship in litigation between challenges based on 
subject-matter eligibility and argumentation in early-stage, low-decision cost 
procedural milestones is highly correlated in both directions. 
Data from ex ante examination in the Patent Office further confirms the 
ability of the subject-matter ineligibility doctrine to stand in for the other, 
more decision cost-intensive patentability requirements.124  A novel dataset 
of the prosecution records for 800 randomly selected patents reveals that, 
where the examiner rejected the claimed invention as patent-ineligible 
subject matter, the examiner in 86.6% of cases also rejected the invention for 
failing to satisfy one of the following requirements:  utility, novelty, 
nonobviousness, enablement, written description, and definiteness.125  That 
is to say, nearly seven out of every eight inventions that were challenged on 
subject-matter ineligibility grounds were also challenged on at least one 
other ground.126  Because failing to satisfy even a single requirement is 
enough to defeat patentability,127 litigation data as well as examination data 
suggest that most patentability disputes that are capable of being resolved on 
the doctrine of subject-matter eligibility are also capable of being resolved 
instead on a different ground. 
These empirical findings indicate that litigated patents whose validity 
is challenged are subjected to subject-matter eligibility attacks as a low-
decision-cost alternative to other grounds.  The empirical findings also 
suggest that issued patents in general that overcome subject-matter eligibility 
rejections usually also overcome rejections on other grounds.  Both ex ante 
and ex post, therefore, the subject-matter eligibility requirement in patent law 
is a significant doctrinal shortcut to the other requirements for 
patentability—and an apparently inexpensive shortcut, at least in terms of 
decision costs.  There are significant problems, however, with this seeming 
 
 124  This empirical approach of comparing and correlating grounds for rejection is similar 
that adopted in an earlier study of administrative appeals of examiner rejections, focusing 
specifically on the correlation between rejections under the enablement requirement and 
rejections under the written description requirement. Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of 
the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1665 (2010). 
 125  Prosecution records are publicly available data obtained from the Patent Office 
website.  The random sample consisted of 800 patents issued during the 10-year period of 
2004 to 2013, inclusive.  The prosecution records of these 800 patents contained 1,771 non-
final and final rejections issued by examiners.  These examiner rejections were reviewed by 
hand and coded as to the grounds for rejection contained within them. 
 126  The specific findings underlying this conclusion are summarized in Table 1. 
 127  35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). 
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benefit. 
C. Problems with the Shortcut 
Using the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter as a sort of cheap 
per se rule of unpatentability is problematic because of how its decision cost 
savings arise.  All of the more fact-intensive requirements for patentability 
can properly be adjudicated only after two interrelated tasks have been 
completed.  One task is to specify the person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which the invention pertains.  Like the reasonably prudent person in tort 
law, the person having ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical perspective 
from which novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and written 
description are explicitly or implicitly evaluated.128  In turn, properly 
specifying the person of ordinary skill requires identifying the art itself, the 
technological field in which the invention is situated.129  The other necessary 
task is to construe the itemized claims of the patent in order to characterize 
precisely what invention is patented.130  The need for resolving these issues 
before adjudicating the novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and 
written description requirements is the very thing that makes each of these 
inquiries so fact-intensive.131 
The Patent Office, for its part, determines the field of invention right 
from the start132 and assigns the patent application to an appropriately trained 
patent examiner,133 who is the agency’s stand-in for the person having 
ordinary skill in the relevant art.134  The patent examiner, meanwhile, 
evaluates the patent application only after construing the applicant’s claims, 
giving the claims their “broadest reasonable construction.”135  Courts, 
however, have generally applied the subject-matter eligibility doctrine 
without regard to the person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
 
 128  For discussion of how pervasively the person having ordinary skill in the art informs 
patentability requirements, see Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological 
Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331 (2013); Jonathan 
J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 227 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004). 
 129  Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 929–31 (discussing the 
overlooked but normatively desirable practice of specifying the field of invention prior to a 
PHOSITA analysis). 
 130  Id. at 925–34 (tracing the doctrinal need for claim construction prior to each of the 
innovation-related and disclosure-related requirements for patentability). 
 131  See supra, note 74 and accompanying text. 
 132  Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 903–04. 
 133  Id. at 906–07. 
 134  Id. at 906.  Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 128, at 888 (arguing that examiners skill “may 
provide a proxy for the tacit knowledge of PHOSITA, but examiners are at best former 
practitioners whose practical technological skills inevitably decline with time”). 
 135  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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patented invention pertains—indeed, without specifying the art at all—and 
without construing the claims of the patent.136 
These lapses in the judicial use of subject-matter eligibility as a per se 
shortcut is problematic for two reasons.  First, in antitrust law, the content of 
the per se rule is to be determined and applied only sparingly: such caution 
is recognized by the literature137 and by the courts.138  The specific types of 
conduct that should be considered so clearly and consistently anticompetitive 
as to be conclusively presumed unreasonable are the result of long 
experience with anticompetitive practices.139  By contrast, the doctrine of 
patent-eligible subject matter has been applied unevenly throughout its 
history, with little empirical basis for presuming that certain requirements 
for patentability in certain contexts will produce results that are so consistent 
that a more fact-intensive inquiry such as novelty, nonobviousness, 
enablement, etc. would be superfluous.140 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even the per se rule requires an 
initial characterization of the relevant market and of the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct.  For example, fixing prices may conclusively be 
presumed illegal,141 but one must still establish the market in which price 
fixing is said to occur.142  Self-evidently, one must also demonstrate that 
what the accused party did was, in fact, tantamount to price-fixing.  By 
contrast, the inquiry into subject-matter eligibility proceeds without 
identifying the field of the invention,143 and frequently without 
characterizing through claim construction what the patent actually claims.144 
 
 136  See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 363–76 (2015). 
 137  Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in 
Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311, 364 (1989); Scott G. Crowley, Note, 
Antitrust: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.—A Better Rule For Vertical 
Restraints, But Is It Legal?, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1035 n.2 (1987); William J. Sims, 
Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents and a Truncated Rule of Reason: Retaining Flexibility 
Without Sacrificing Efficiency, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 198 (1985). 
 138  Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1977). 
 139  White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).  But see Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982) (distinguishing between the creation of new per 
se prohibitions and the application of existing ones). 
 140  Duffy, supra note 7, at 623–38 (discussing the historical record of judicial failures in 
crafting stable, durable rules of patentability). 
 141  Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1982); Standard Oil Co. 
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).   
 142  See Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “it is an 
element of a per se case to describe the relevant market in which we may presume the 
anticompetitive effect would occur”). 
 143  Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 906–08 (discussing the rarity 
with which courts make any initial taxonomic determinations at all on their way to more 
substantive conclusions about patent validity). 
 144  Holbrook & Janis, supra note 136, at 363–64. 
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Thus, the supposed judicial efficiency of evaluating patent validity on 
the basis of subject-matter ineligibility comes at the risk of making an 
incorrect evaluation.  Decision costs may be lower, but error costs are likely 
higher.  For this reason, the way in which courts currently use the doctrine 
of subject-matter ineligibility as an inexpensive shortcut for other, more 
precise doctrinal patentability requirements is unsound. 
IV. BORROWING MORE RESPONSIBLY FROM ANTITRUST 
The inappropriateness of the current practice, however, is not to say 
that subject-matter eligibility may never be used to avoid more judicially 
costly doctrinal inquiries.  The example of antitrust is itself a lesson that 
approaches for lowering decision cost are not to be disregarded lightly—so 
long as they are not employed lightly, either.  Just as the rule of reason can 
give way to per se simplifications, costlier patentability doctrines can also 
give way to a simpler subject-matter eligibility analysis, where certain 
antecedent requirements have been satisfied in order to minimize error and 
where the resulting subject-matter eligibility analysis still presents a lower 
decision cost. 
A. Defining the Market: The Field of Invention 
One antecedent requirement before evaluating whether an invention 
constitutes patent-eligible subject matter is defining the field of the 
invention.  The field of invention is a long-overlooked inquiry in how the 
courts assess patentability, and not only in subject-matter eligibility issues.  
Every major requirement for patentability implicates an underlying 
taxonomic choice about how to define the field of a given invention.145  The 
Patent Office makes these taxonomic choices regularly, informedly, and 
systematically in accordance with express statutory authority,146 but courts 
ignore, assume, or improvise this important inquiry.147 
What courts do instead, at least implicitly, is adjudicate patentability 
questions such as novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, etc., from the 
perspective of the person having ordinary skill in the art.148  This is a step 
toward resolving a given patentability issue more accurately by defining the 
scope of the inquiry more precisely—just as defining the relevant market in 
antitrust does.  Identifying only the person having ordinary skill in the art, 
however, is insufficient for this purpose in two ways.  One is that the inquiry 
is litigated between adversarial parties who have a direct and partisan interest 
 
 145  See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
 146  See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 147  See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 148  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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in the substantive effects of how to define the person of ordinary skill in the 
art.  As a result, the evidence that parties present to courts and the 
conclusions that courts ultimately reach may bear little relation to the actual 
field of a given invention.149 
Another reason is that resolving this question in the courts at all 
presents a significant structural bias based on hindsight, even apart from the 
private biases of the litigants.150  When the Patent Office classifies an 
invention according to its technological taxonomy and assigns the invention 
to a patent examiner trained in that field as a stand-in for the person having 
ordinary skill in the relevant art, the determinations of the agency are much 
closer in time to the actual state of science and technology within which the 
invention was developed.151  By the time patents have been issued, have been 
asserted, and are being litigated in court years later, the state of technology 
will have changed, sometimes dramatically.152  The result is that even courts 
that are willing and able to look beyond the self-interested arguments of 
litigants confront significant difficulties in accurately recapturing a past state 
of affairs from scratch. 
For these reasons, courts evaluating whether a given patentability 
requirement, such as nonobviousness or enablement, has been satisfied 
should defer to the taxonomic classifications made by the Patent Office 
during examination.153  Under ordinary principles of administrative law, 
these agency classifications are informal adjudications of fact that should 
survive except where courts find them arbitrary and capricious.154  Disputes 
in litigation over Patent Office classifications may, indeed, increase in the 
short run as courts begin to give this appropriate deference.  However, the 
 
 149  This criticism has much in common (though is not congruent) with broader criticisms 
of the “adversarial legalism” in American civil litigation.  The adversarial legalism critique, 
too, emphasizes the cost and uncertainty generated by relying on individual partisan lawsuits 
as a mode of social governance.  E.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2003). 
 150  Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523–27 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive 
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 613–14 (1998).  
Hindsight bias in patent law is most commonly discussed in the context of the nonobviousness 
requirement.  E.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration 
That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).  
As the broader discussion by Professors Jolls, et al., and Rachlinski show, however, there is 
no reason to expect that hindsight bias is not a risk in any number of patentability-related 
inquiries, both legal and factual. 
 151  Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 41, at 939–40.   
 152  Id. at 45. 
 153  Id. at 43–50 (discussing the general case for judicial deference, articulating the legal 
standard by which judges ought to practice deference, and the operational form that deference 
should take where technological taxonomy is concerned). 
 154  Id. at 46. 
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early resolution of the field of the invention will also offer greater up-front 
clarity about downstream issues, such as who the person having ordinary 
skill in that field might be and what scope the patent should be interpreted as 
having. 
The same logic and the same benefits apply to the subject-matter 
eligibility doctrine as well.  The policies that have animated judicial 
development of what ought to be patent-eligible are broadly concerned with 
innovation and disclosure.155  Thus, inventions must be truly innovative in 
the sense of having sufficient human intervention to differentiate them and 
render them more useful as compared to what nature already provides.156  
They must also be sufficiently well disclosed in the sense that patents must 
teach everything that they claim and describe everything that they exclude.157  
In short, patents must not preempt products of nature or principles of nature, 
nor the knowledge that these represent, for the use and application of these 
natural products and principles should remain available for others to build 
and innovate upon.  This anxiety over preemption, and the Court’s use of the 
subject-matter eligibility doctrine to address it, is reflected in cases as old as 
Morse158 and as recent as Mayo.159 
What such judicial uses of the eligibility doctrine have lacked thus far, 
however, is a rule of decision for defining the technological domain within 
which a patent can be evaluated as overbroad and therefore preemptive—or 
else not overbroad and therefore eligible.  That is to say, before a court can 
determine that a patent preempts an entire field, the court must know what 
the relevant field is.  This is precisely the taxonomic exercise that the Patent 
Office conducts at the outset of every patent examination in accordance with 
its statutory authority and agency expertise.160  Thus, a court that sets out to 
define the relevant technology within which to scrutinize the preemptive 
breadth of a patent need only defer to the Patent Office classification of the 
field of invention under ordinary principles of administrative law, adding 
little decision cost but considerably reducing potential error cost. 
B. Defining the Conduct: Claim Construction 
The other antecedent requirement before evaluating whether an 
invention constitutes patent-eligible subject matter is construing the patent 
claims to determine what they actually encompass.  Claim construction is a 
 
 155  See supra Part III.A. 
 156  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 157  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 158  See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 159  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 160  Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 41, at 903–04. 
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key inquiry both in patent examination161 and patent litigation,162 such that 
judges who handle even a modest caseload of patent disputes quickly 
become familiar with it.163  Nevertheless, this familiarity is rarely 
synonymous with expertise, sometimes even for judges who see large 
numbers of patent cases.164  Claim constructions by trial courts are reversed 
on appeal at notoriously high rates in the Federal Circuit.165 
As a result, claim constructions in district courts pose particularly acute 
problems of uncertainty in the contours of patent rights.  At one side is 
vertical certainty, the assurance that a patent that is construed one way in the 
district court will likely be construed the same way on appeal, reducing the 
need for protracted and expensive litigation.166  The Federal Circuit can offer 
this assurance by evaluating lower-court claim constructions under a 
deferential standard of appellate review.167  The cost of this deferential 
review, however, is less horizontal certainty, the assurance that a patent that 
is construed one way in a given litigation will be construed the same way in 
other litigations.168  To defer to lower courts, after all, is to allow inconsistent 
outcomes to coexist unless they are so indefensible that they must be 
overturned.169  The Federal Circuit can ensure horizontal certainty only by 
reviewing patent claim constructions de novo, and in that framework, the 
 
 161  Joel Miller, Claim Construction at the PTO—The “Broadest Reasonable 
Interpretation. . .”, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279 (2006). 
 162  Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: 
A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714–15 (2010). 
 163  Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study 
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 
746 n.283 (2003) (citation omitted) (indicating that federal trial court judges are “quite 
familiar with the analytical rules of claim construction”).  
 164  See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 223 (2008) (finding 
that there is no significant relationship between judges’ cumulative experience with claim 
construction and the likelihood of having their claim construction rulings reversed on appeal 
in the Federal Circuit). 
 165  See, e.g., id.; J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(2013); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); W. Michael Schuster, Claim Construction and 
Technical Training: An Empirical Study of the Reversal Rates of Technically Trained Judges 
in Patent Claim Construction Cases, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 887 (2011); David L. Schwartz, 
Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent 
Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009). 
 166  See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 
571, 595 (2016) (discussing the trade-off between the costs of decision and error in a given 
lawsuit versus the costs of decision and error as to the same patent across many lawsuits).  
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
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result is necessarily that district courts’ claim constructions in a given case 
will receive less appellate deference and so will be reversed more often, 
producing high vertical uncertainty.170  Indeed, this is precisely the choice 
with which the Supreme Court was recently confronted. 
The Supreme Court held over twenty years ago that the enterprise of 
claim construction is not wholly a question of law, nor of fact, but instead is 
a “mongrel practice.”171  Only recently, in 2015, did the Supreme Court 
further clarify that the subsidiary factual findings that a court makes in the 
course of construing patent claims are not to be reviewed de novo, but under 
a “clear error” standard.172  In other words, the Court favored vertical 
certainty in a nod toward the decision costs that district courts invest into 
construing claims.  However, these claim construction investments are not a 
systematic part of determining whether a patent is directed to eligible subject 
matter.  Instead, courts have mixed local practices regarding whether 
motions to dismiss—which overwhelmingly rely on subject-matter 
eligibility challenges173—are indeed permitted to make a subject matter-
based challenge prior to claim construction.174 
Although these local practices differ based on the varying weight that 
judges give to efficiency considerations—i.e., to their decision costs as 
individual courts—the availability of subject-matter eligibility challenges 
without claim construction ignores the considerable potential for error in 
making broad generalizations about the boundaries of the patent system itself 
without any precise understanding of the individual patents whose claimed 
subject matter is deemed eligible or not.  Just as per se analysis in antitrust, 
for all its categorical severity, still requires characterizing the allegedly 
unlawful economic conduct, so also should per se-style analysis of 
patentability require characterizing the allegedly patent-ineligible subject 
matter. 
There are at least two ways in which to structure this inquiry without 
incurring the fact-discovery costs of a full-blown claim construction.  One is 
to require a proposed claim construction by the patent owner itself and to 
take that construction as true for purposes of the subject-matter eligibility 
evaluation.  This method is well in line with the general pleading-stage rule 
that, for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, courts must accept factual matters as true and draw all reasonable 
 
 170  Id. 
 171  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372, 378 (1996). 
 172  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
 173  See infra Figure 1. 
 174  Divergent local practices as to Alice motions in the pleading stage are also the subject 
of a work in progress by Professor Paul Gugliuzza. 
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inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—here, the patent owner.175 
The second method is to allow limited discovery of only those fact 
questions that bear on subject-matter eligibility, especially defining the field 
of invention and the person of ordinary skill in that art.  This, too, would be 
in line with the common pleading-stage practice of allowing matters outside 
the pleadings, thereby converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment.176 
Under both approaches, the additional decision costs can be limited so 
that the gains of quickly adjudicating patents that clearly constitute patent-
ineligible subject matter are not dissipated.  A patent that fails even under 
these generous circumstances may reliably be invalidated without a high risk 
of error.  A patent that survives a subject-matter eligibility challenge, 
meanwhile, may still face more detailed scrutiny about patentability.  This 
outcome, too, has a clear analog in the antitrust approach to decision costs 
and error costs.  Accused antitrust violators can avoid per se condemnation 
if they survive so-called quick look review, a tentative evaluation of facts 
that tend to show procompetitive effects from the accused conduct.177  
Surviving quick-look review does not establish per se legality, but merely 
escapes per se illegality and invites a more detailed analysis under the rule 
of reason.178  Similarly, patents that survive a subject-matter eligibility 
challenge on the pleadings or after limited fact discovery would not be held 
per se valid, but would merely escape per se invalidation and proceed to a 
more detailed review under narrower, more specific patentability doctrines 
such as novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and so on. 
C. Avoiding the Question: The Crouch-Merges Canon 
The preceding discussion of antecedent requirements for a proper 
subject-matter eligibility inquiry argues for a robust rethinking of current 
patent practice, but these proposed reforms are not unbounded.  Satisfying 
these requirements merely takes proper account of error costs, and the 
resulting subject-matter eligibility analysis may sometimes still present a 
decision cost that is low enough to warrant per se or quick look-style 
adjudication.  At other times, however, the resulting analysis may prove to 
be no cheaper than a narrower patentability analysis such as novelty or 
nonobviousness would have been.  In these cases, there is good reason to 
 
 175  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2015). 
 176  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 
 177  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–71 (1999). 
 178  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677–78 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding from a quick 
look that a full inquiry under the rule of reason was necessary because the university financial 
aid agreements in question had sufficiently procompetitive potential). 
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avoid the subject-matter eligibility doctrine and instead to decide the 
question on narrower grounds for patentability. 
This avoidance doctrine has been advanced by Professors Crouch and 
Merges based on pragmatic policy concerns and on empirical findings that 
avoidance would be meaningfully available.179  Specifically, they find that 
“a substantial number of patent claims lacking subject matter eligibility 
under of [sic] § 101 also fail to satisfy at least one other validity test.”180  By 
one estimate, some 84% of patent applications that are rejected for subject-
matter ineligibility are also rejected for failing either novelty or 
nonobviousness.181  By another estimate, conducted by Crouch and Merges, 
in 94% of administrative appeals from examiner rejections, claims that 
examiners reject on subject-matter eligibility grounds are also rejected on at 
least one other ground.182  The novel dataset and study presented above on 
grounds for rejection found in the prosecution records of 800 randomly 
selected patents, similarly finds that about 87% of patent applications that 
are rejected for subject-matter eligibility are also rejected as lacking either 
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, written description, or 
definiteness.183 
However, an empirical view of patent-eligible subject matter as a 
meaningful per se shortcut to other validity criteria additionally raises the 
reverse question: how frequently do patent claims that raise validity concerns 
under one of the narrower patentability requirements (of utility, novelty, 
nonobviousness, enablement, written description, or definiteness) also 
implicate the broader issue of subject-matter eligibility?  Analysis of the 
same novel dataset reveals that this occurs in only 9.4% of patents.  
Moreover, only in 1.5% of patents is subject-matter eligibility observed as a 
validity concern without any of the other identified requirements. 
Thus, avoiding subject-matter eligibility by relying on a narrower 
ground is feasible for a large majority of patents (estimated by various 
measures as 84%, 87%, or 94%).  Avoiding subject-matter eligibility is 
unlikely to leave otherwise invalid patents in force, for only in relatively few 
patents (9.4%) does a narrow validity concern also implicate the broad 
problems of subject-matter eligibility.  And for only a very small subset of 
patents (1.5%) does the subject-matter eligibility doctrine do validity-
determinative work that no other doctrine does.  This data independently 
 
 179  Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering 
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010). 
 180  Id. at 1686. 
 181  Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent 
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844 (2013). 
 182  Crouch & Merges, supra note 179, at 1686. 
 183  See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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corroborates, therefore, that the Crouch-Merges proposal would be an apt 
avoidance canon by filtering most cases with little risk of error and leaving 
relatively few difficult cases in which the avoided doctrine plays a truly 
useful, outcome-determinative role. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues to re-conceptualize the relationship between patent 
law’s subject-matter eligibility requirement and the other major 
requirements for patentability as akin to the relationship in antitrust law 
between the per se rule and the rule of reason in evaluating restraints of trade.  
Courts’ use of subject-matter eligibility as a shortcut to other patentability 
requirements appears to offer significant savings in decision cost, but these 
savings likely come at the expense of higher error costs because courts 
currently fail to answer necessary underlying questions about the nature of 
the invention and the technological field in which the invention is situated.  
Engaging in a subject-matter eligibility analysis without answering these 
questions is no more sensible than condemning an economic activity as per 
se anticompetitive without defining the relevant market and characterizing 
the economic activity in antitrust law. 
The remedy for this ill-conceived reduction in decision cost while 
ignoring error cost is threefold.  First, courts should evaluate the subject-
matter eligibility of patented inventions only after specifying the 
technological field of the patented invention and identifying the person of 
ordinary skill in that relevant field, just as the Patent Office does.  Second, 
courts that purport to find patents invalid for claiming patent-ineligible 
subject matter should do so only after construing what invention the patent 
actually claims.  Finally, courts should adopt a canon of avoiding questions 
of patent eligibility altogether in favor of deciding patentability on narrower 
statutory grounds whenever possible.  These measures offer a more 
jurisprudentially disciplined way for courts to balance their competing 
obligations to resolve patent cases both efficiently and accurately. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.  The Use of Subject Matter Eligibility with Other Grounds for 
Rejection in Patent Office Examination 
 
Ground for Rejection
Made Together with 
Subject-Matter Eligibility
Share
Utility 0.00% 
Novelty 56.10%
Non-obviousness 68.29%
Enablement 8.54% 
Written Description 8.54% 
Definiteness 43.90%
Cumulative share 
(at least one of the above) 
86.59%
 
Each individual share is calculated by reference to the total number of 
rejections on a given ground.   
 
For example: 
share for novelty = 
# of examiner rejections that contained both a  
novelty challenge and a subject matter eligibility  
challenge 
total # of examiner rejections that contained a  
subject matter eligibility challenge 
 
The cumulative share is calculated by combining the individual shares as 
follows: 
 
cumulative share = 
# of examiner rejections that contained both a  
novelty challenge and at least one of the above  
grounds 
total # of examiner rejections that contained a 
 subject matter eligibility challenge 
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Figure 1.  Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions to Dismiss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions for Judgment 
on the Pleadings 
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Figure 3.  Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Stages of Litigation at Which Subject-Matter Ineligibility Is 
Asserted 
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Figure 5.  Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Utility Is Asserted 
 
 
Figure 6.  Stages of Litigation at Which Anticipation Is Asserted 
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Figure 7.  Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Obviousness Is 
Asserted 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Enablement Is 
Asserted 
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Figure 9.  Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Written Description 
Is Asserted 
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